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11 Introduction
Many environmental problems are transboundary in the sense that emissions
caused by the production and/or consumption in one particular country aﬀect
the wellbeing of consumers in other countries. The emissions of CO2 give
rise to such transboundary environmental problems, since global warming
may inﬂuence the living conditions of mankind in all countries irrespective
of where the sources of emissions are located. Similarly, emissions of sulphur
are spread by the wind across country boarders, meaning that the emissions
undertaken by a particular country will cause environmental damage in other
countries as well. This type of environmental problem has received a lot of
attention in the literature1.
The appropriate design of ’environmental taxation’ (and other correc-
tive policies) to internalize transboundary externalities from environmental
damage typically depends on the whole set of objectives, instruments and
restrictions facing policy makers. The methods to achieve distributional ob-
jectives and the potential mobility of tax bases across countries are particu-
larly important in this context. For instance, if policy makers cannot observe
the ability (or productivity) of diﬀerent individuals, distributional objectives
may necessitate the use of distortionary taxation. This means, in turn, that
environmentally motivated taxes become part of a distortionary tax system.
S i m i l a r l y ,i ft h el a b o rf o r c ei sm o b i l e ,i ti sr e a s o n a b l et oa s s u m et h a td i f -
ferences in environmental and other policies between countries will induce
migration. Since the size and composition of the labor force are likely to
aﬀect both the ’environmental quality’ and the tax base, one may generally
expect the incentives related to migration to inﬂuence public policy. Policy
implications of labor mobility are thoroughly addressed in the literature on
1Previous research includes Mäler (1989), Barrett (1990, 1994), Carraro and Siniscalco
(1993), Cesar (1994), Tahvonen (1994, 1995), Mäler and de Zeeuw (1995), Aronsson and
Löfgren (2000) and Aronsson et al. (2000).
2ﬁscal federalism2, although commonly neglected in the context of environ-
mental policy3.
In this paper, we address transboundary environmental problems in the
context of an optimal tax problem, where (part of) the labor force is mobile
across countries. The analysis is based on a multi-country model, where the
c o n s u m e r si ne a c hc o u n t r yd i ﬀer with respect to ability, and the (national)
tax instruments include commodity taxation and nonlinear income taxation.
The paper contributes to the existing literature in at least two ways. First,
it relates the taxation of global externalities to other aspects of ﬁscal policy
and recognizes that the tax revenues are raised by distortionary taxation.
Previous studies on transboundary environmental problems typically disre-
gard distributional objectives and tax revenue requirements, which means
that the ﬁrst best resource allocation can be achieved by Pigouvian taxation
on a global level. It is, therefore, important to extend the study of trans-
boundary environmental problems to situations, where the ﬁscal policy also
aims at fulﬁlling distributional objectives, and the tax revenues are raised by
distortionary taxation. Second, previous studies on environmental policy in
economies with distributional objectives and/or distortionary taxation are
based on ’one-country’ model economies4, in which there are no room for
transboundary environmental problems. Seen from this point of view, the
paper extends the literature on taxation of environmental externalities in the
presence of other tax distortions.
Each individual country will be described by a variant of the two-type
model used by Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997). Their basic model is here ex-
tended by assuming that the environmental damage caused by one particular
2See e.g. Wildasin (1991) and Boadway et al. (1998).
3Sandmo and Wildasin (1999) and Hoel and Shapiro (2000) are notable exceptions..
4See e.g. Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994), Pirttilä
and Tuomala (1997) and Aronsson (1999). See also Golder (1995) for a literature review
on the ’double dividend’ issue.
3country will aﬀect other countries as well, and by allowing for mobility among
high ability types. One purpose of the paper is to compare the (conditionally
optimal) second best policy in a noncooperative equilibrium with that of a
cooperative equilibrium. Since the environmental damage is assumed to orig-
inate from the aggregate consumption of a speciﬁc commodity - to be called a
’dirty’ good - a particular concern will be to study what factors determine the
optimal choice of commodity taxation. We show that the mobility incentives
characterizing the high ability types may inﬂuence the optimal commodity
tax (as well as the eﬀective marginal tax rates) via two distinct channels in
the noncooperative regime. First, to avoid a loss of tax base, the national
government has an incentive to choose a lower commodity tax than would
be chosen in the absence of labor mobility. Second, since out-migration re-
duces the aggregate consumption of the dirty good, the national government
can reduce the domestically created environmental damage by stimulating
out-migration. Since each national government treats the policy variables of
other countries as exogenous, this provides an incentive to choose a higher
commodity tax than in the absence of mobility. However, irrespective of
which of these two eﬀects is dominating, part of the externality will remain
uninternalized in the noncooperative equilibrium.
In the cooperative regime, on the other hand, all externalities are in-
ternalized on a global level, which means that the optimal commodity tax
facing a country will reﬂect all welfare eﬀects (both domestically and abroad)
caused by that particular country’s emissions. The ﬁscal policy implicit in
the cooperative equilibrium suggests that each country’s commodity tax does
not only depend on the sum of all countries’ willingness to pay to avoid its
contribution to the externality (as it would in the absence of distortionary
taxation). It also depends on the restrictions underlying the distributional
policy in all countries. This has in interesting interpretation: the desire to
avoid mimicking in a particular country inﬂuences the commodity taxes in
4other countries as well.
Another purpose is to study whether a ’federal’ government can imple-
ment the cooperative equilibrium is a decentralized setting, where each in-
dividual country chooses its policy in isolation by acting in accordance with
the noncooperative model. We show that it is, in principle, possible to imple-
ment the cooperative equilibrium in a decentralized framework, even if this
requires that the federal government has access to some ’nonstandard’ policy
instrument. To take the issue of cooperation a bit further, the ﬁnal part of
the paper addresses the welfare consequences of an agreement between the
countries to slightly change their commodity taxes, when the prereform situ-
ation is given by the noncooperative equilibrium. The latter makes it possible
to identify conditions under which the optimal direction of such a tax reform
is to increase or decrease the commodity taxes. This is interesting both as a
’practical’ alternative to full cooperation over the environmental policy and
by providing a framework for studying green tax reform in a global economy
with preexisting tax distortions.
There only exist a couple of earlier studies concerning transboundary ex-
ternalities and labor mobility. Sandmo and Wildasin (1999) focus on the
optimal environmental and immigration policies from the point of view of a
single jurisdiction, which treats the actions taken in other jurisdictions as ex-
ogenous. It is shown how the ’conditionally optimal’ environmental tax (i.e.
whether or not this tax can be calculated by using a standard Pigouvian
formula) depends on what instrument is being used to control immigration.
Hoel and Shapiro (2000) also address transboundary environmental problems
under a mobile population. Their most important result is that a noncoop-
erative equilibrium with free mobility across jurisdictions will, under certain
conditions, imply a pareto eﬃcient allocation of the resources. In this case,
therefore, there is no reason to have an international (or interjurisdictional)
coordination of the environmental policy. Our paper diﬀers from the studies
5by Sandmo and Wildasin (1999) and Hoel and Shapiro (2000) both in terms
of focus and use of policy instruments.
The model is formally described in Section 2. Section 3 addresses the tax
and expenditure policies implicit in a cooperative equilibrium. The coopera-
tive equilibrium is based on the assumption of a benthamite ’global planner’,
who chooses tax and expenditure policies for all countries involved. Section
4 concerns optimal tax and expenditure policies, when the countries form
their policies in isolation. In Section 5, we examine a global tax/subsidy
scheme, which will be designed to give the individual countries incentives to
choose the cooperative equilibrium. Section 6 addresses the welfare eﬀects of
introducing an additional, and cooperatively chosen, commodity tax in the
noncooperative equilibrium. Section 7 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
We begin by a presentation of the model. With the model at our disposal,
we shall brieﬂy characterize the equilibria resulting from full cooperation and
a noncooperative Nash-game between the countries, respectively. From the
point of view of the analysis to be carried out below, the number of countries
is not important (as long as there is more than one country). We shall,
therefore, simplify by considering a two-country economy. The two countries
are identical in all important respects.
Each country consists of two types of individuals; type-1 individuals with
lower ability and type-2 individuals with higher ability, so w2
j >w 1
j,w h e r e
wi
j is the gross wage rate facing an individual of type i in country j.I n d i -
viduals earn labor income, Y i
j = wi
jli
j,w i t hli
j denoting labor supply. Income
is taxed according to a nonlinear schedule, and each individual allocates
his/her post-tax income, Bi
j, between a ’clean’ consumption good, ci
j,a n d
a ’dirty’ consumption good, xi
j. The aggregate consumption of dirty goods
6creates an externality, Ej (see below), which spills over to the other country.
Each individual behaves as if the aggregate consumption of dirty goods is
exogenous.
An individual of type i in country j chooses consumption and labor supply









j,g j,E j,E k) (1)
for j =1 ,2,a n dk 6= j,w h e r egj denotes consumption of a public good. We
normalize the price of c to one and denote the price of x by q. The budget










where Tj(·) is an income tax function. The price of the dirty consumption
good is deﬁned as qj = pj + tj,w h e r epj is the producer price and tj a unit
tax.
Following Christiansen (1984) we start by solving the utility maximization
problem conditional on the labor supply. By choosing ci
j and xi
j to maximize
the utility function subject to equation (2), while using the short notation
Bi
j = Y i
j − Tj(Y i









j ,g j,E j,E k) (3)
for k 6= j, in which we have used li
j = Y i
j /wi
j and then suppressed the wage
rate. Note that, even if the two ability types have identical preferences, the
functions v1
j(·) and v2
j(·) will diﬀer because the wage rates diﬀer across ability


















j ) is the marginal income tax rate corresponding to income level
Y i





j] decreases with wi
j.
As we mentioned above, the externalities are generated by the aggregate







We assume that externalities generated domestically as well as abroad are
negative, meaning that ∂vi
j/∂Ej < 0 and ∂vi
j/∂Ek < 0.
The high ability types are mobile across countries, whereas the low ability
types are not. To determine migration, we use the ’attachment to home’ idea
developed by Mansoorian and Myers (1997), which will here be interpreted as
if individuals have a psychological attachment to their native country. This
disutility of migration varies between individuals of the high ability type. By
ranking individuals in terms of increasing order of disutility of migration, we
denote by d(M) the disutility of the M:the individual of type 2 if he/she
decides to migrate. We assume d
0(M) > 0, d(0) = 0 and −d(M)=d(−M).
This enables us to determine the number of individuals migrating out of













k ,g k,E k,E j) − d(Mj) (6)
for j =1 ,2,a n dk 6= j.N o t et h a tMj(·) can be either positive or negative.
The migration out of country j, Mj(·), decreases with B2
j, gj, qk and Y 2
k ,
increases with qj, Y 2
j , B2
k and gk,w h e r e a st h ee ﬀects of the externality terms,
Ej and Ek, are in general ambiguous. If the domestically created externality
gives rise to more (less) disutility at the margin than the externality created
5Boadway et al. (1998) use a similar model to determine migration between states in
an economic federation.
8by the other country, then ∂Mj(·)/∂Ej > 0 (< 0)a n d∂Mj(·)/∂Ek < 0 (> 0)
for k 6= j.
3 A Cooperative Equilibrium
In a cooperative equilibrium, all externalities are internalized on a global
level. Suppose that the resource allocation is decided upon by a ’global
planner’, who is acting as a benthamite welfare-maximizer. The planner
will choose tax and expenditure policies to maximize the sum of the country
speciﬁc objective functions subject to all restrictions characterizing the two
economies. Since the two countries are identical, the cooperative equilibrium
will be a symmetric equilibrium with no migration. This is recognized by
the planner and we can, therefore, delete any references to migration. The
policy we will study in this section can be regarded to be the restricted ﬁrst
best policy on a global level. That is, it is a pareto eﬃcient policy, given the
technological and informational constraints.
The objective of the global planner is to maximize the sum of the util-
ities of the type 1 individuals subject to constraints. The ﬁrst constraint








j ,g j,E j,E k) − ¯ v
2 ≥ 0 (7)
Second, for each country there is a self selection constraint, which rules out














j ,g j,E j,E k) ≥ 0 (8)
To simplify the notations as much as possible, we normalize the population in
each country such that there is one low ability type and one high ability type.
9We also assume that the budget within each country has to be balanced. The



















j ,g j,E j,E k) and rj is
the price of public goods.
The Lagrangean corresponding to the global planner’s optimization prob-








j(·) − ¯ v
2]+λj[v
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j ,g j,E j,E k). The optimal tax and expenditure





j, gj, qj and Ej. Since the externality is modelled in terms of a
separate restriction in the Lagrangean, we treat Ej as a decision variable.
This procedure will provide a shadow price of the externality, which is useful
in the analysis of optimal tax rules below. In addition to equations (5), (7),



























































































































































































where j =1 ,2. As is standard in the optimal tax literature, the optimization
problem is not necessarily well behaved. To be able to compare our results
with those of Pirtillä and Tuomala (1997), we assume that a unique equi-
librium exists in which the shadow prices corresponding to the self-selection
constraint and the government’s budget constraint are strictly positive, i.e.
λj > 0 and γj > 0 at the equilibrium. Since the two countries are identi-
cal by assumption, this equilibrium will be symmetric in the sense that the
planner chooses identical policies for the two countries. We therefore concen-
trate the analysis to the representative country, which will be indexed by ”j”.
The country speciﬁc index makes it easy to distinguish between domestically
generated externalities and externalities generated by the ’foreign’ country.
3.1 Shadow price of externalities
In the context of a ’one-country’ economy, Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997) have
shown that the shadow price of the externality over the shadow price of the
government’s resource constraint plays an important role in the context of
policy rules. To derive this ’normalized’ shadow price for the economy set




k] to measure the marginal
willingness to pay by a type i in country k to avoid the externality created
by country j. In addition, let us denote the Hicksian demands for clean and
11dirty consumption goods by ˜ ci
j and ˜ xi
j, respectively. We shall also make use

















































































Finally, by using the short notation ¯ λk = λk[∂ˆ v2
k/∂B1
k]/γk, and that the
symmetric equilibrium implies µ1 = µ2 and γ1 = γ2, we obtain the following
result;
Proposition 1 In a cooperative symmetric equilibrium with pareto eﬃcient
mixed taxation, the shadow price of the externality in terms of the govern-




























Equation (19) extends the shadow price derived by Pirttilä and Tuomala
(1997) to apply in a global economy, where the externality generated by each
6This procedure is described by Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997).
12country aﬀects the wellbeing of consumers in both countries. The ﬁrst term





j,k > 0, measures the sum
of the individuals´ marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality. This
part of equation (19) takes the same general form as the shadow price of the
externality in a ﬁrst best cooperative equilibrium.
The second term, −
P
k ¯ λk[ˆ Ω2
j,k − Ω1
j,k],r e ﬂects the inﬂuence of the self-
selection constraints. More speciﬁcally, note that the self-selection con-
straints of both countries will in general aﬀect the shadow price of the ex-
ternality facing country j. This provides an interesting link between the
countries: the desire to make mimicking less attractive in a particular coun-
try will inﬂuence the shadow price facing the other country in the cooperative
equilibrium. The sign of the second term depends on whether a true type
1 is willing to pay more or less than the mimicker to avoid the externality.
If ∂Ωi
j,k/∂li
j < 0, meaning that the marginal willingness to pay to avoid the
externality increases with leisure, and since ¯ λk > 0, the contribution of each
self-selection constraint will be to reduce µj/γj. If, on the other hand, the
marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality decreases with leisure,






k/∂Ej) shows how the externality caused by country j
aﬀects the revenues from commodity taxation in both countries via changes
in each tax base. Note also that the ’feedback-parameter’, ρj,m u s tb ep o s i -
tive in order to guarantee stability of the model, which has been pointed out
by Sandmo (1980).
3.2 Commodity tax
We next derive an expression for the optimal commodity-tax on the dirty
consumption good. The starting point is the necessary condition for qj given




j,w ec a n
solve equations (11) and (13) for −[∂v1
j/∂B1
j]x1




13respectively, and substitute into equation (15). Then, by applying the Slutsky
condition and noting that tj = qj − pj, we obtain the following result;





















Equation (20) provides an implicit expression for the tax rate, which
consists of two parts. The ﬁrst part shows the formula for the commodity
tax that would apply in the absence of any externalities. Since λj > 0
and ∂e xi
j/∂qj < 0 for i =1 ,2, the sign of this term depends on whether
a true type 1 consumes more or less of the dirty consumption good than
the mimicker. Edwards et al. (1994) analyze this aspect of commodity
taxation in detail. The second part is the shadow price of the externality.
The diﬀerence between equation (20) and the corresponding tax formula in
case the externalities constitute pure national problems (i.e. in the absence
of transboundary eﬀects of environmental damage) is that the shadow price
of the externality implicit in equation (20) reﬂects how the environmental
damage caused by country j aﬀects both countries.
Most previous studies on global externalities disregard other tax distor-
tions. Indeed, if the government is able to observe ability types, lump-sum
taxation would be a feasible policy option and the ﬁrst best becomes a nat-
ural reference case. Propositions 1 and 2 then suggest that the commodity





j,k, which is the formula for a Pigouvian tax
under global externalities (see e.g. van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) and
Aronsson and Löfgren (2000)). By comparing this ’ﬁr s tb e s tt a xr u l e ’w i t h
equation (20), it becomes clear that the nature of externality based taxation
is very much dependent upon the whole set of policy instruments. According
to equations (19) and (20), measuring the shadow price of the externality
14created by country j does not only require information about how much the
consumers in both countries are willing to pay to avoid this externality. It
also requires knowledge about whether this marginal willingness to pay in-
creases or decreases with leisure, and how Ej aﬀects the consumption of dirty
goods in both countries.
3.3 ’Eﬀe c t i v e ’M a r g i n a lT a xR a t e s













j ,g j,E j,E k)
in which we have used Bi
j = Y i
j − Tj(Y i
j ).B yd i ﬀerentiating with respect to
Y i

































Equation (21) gives the eﬀective marginal tax rate on a general form and has
been derived by e.g. Edwards et al. (1994). By using equations (10)-(13)
and (21), it is straight forward to show that the eﬀective marginal tax rates































































which are analogous to the formulas derived by Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997)
in the context of a ’one-country’ economy. The only diﬀerence is that the
eﬀective marginal tax rates are evaluated in a cooperative equilibrium, where
the shadow price of the externality relevant for country j is dependent upon
how Ej inﬂuences consumption and welfare in both countries.
154 A Noncooperative Equilibrium
This section concerns the ’conditionally optimal’ tax policies that will arise
in a noncooperative equilibrium, where each country is acting as a Nash-
competitor. Thus, we now assume that each country chooses its tax and
expenditure policies in isolation, and that each ’national’ policy maker treats
the decision variables of the other country as exogenous.
The objective of each national policy maker is to maximize the utility of
the low ability type subject to four restrictions. The constraint that there
must be a minimum utility level for the high ability type and the self-selection
constraint are analogous to their counterparts in Section 3. However, in the
noncooperative framework, it is no longer possible to suppress the mobility
incentives, since each country solves its tax and provision problem conditional
on the policies chosen by the other country. By normalizing the population
of each ability type to equal one prior to migration, the budget constraint
facing the policy maker in country j can be written
Y
1



















j ,g j,E j,E k).M i g r a t i o n
also aﬀects the form of the externality constraint
Ej = x
1
j(·) − {1 − Mj(·)}x
2
j(·) (23)





























j(·) − {1 − Mj(·)}x
2
j(·)]
16The optimal tax and expenditure policies can be derived by maximizing the




j, gj, qj and Ej. In addition to












































































































































































































































where j =1 ,2,a n dZ2























solve planner j’s optimization problem, where the superindex ”n”i su s e da sa
short notation for the noncooperative equilibrium. We deﬁne (Φn
1,Φn
2) to be
a noncooperative Nash-equilibrium if Φn
1 is optimal for country 1 conditional
on Φ2 = Φn
2,a n dΦn
2 is optimal for country 2 conditional on Φ1 = Φn
1.I n
what follows, we assume that the countries have reached the noncooperative
Nash-equilibrium and drop the superindex ”n” to simplify the notations.
To be able to compare the results with those of Section 3, we also assume
that the shadow prices corresponding to the self-selection constraint and the
government’s budget constraint are strictly positive, i.e. λj > 0 and γj > 0
at the equilibrium.
Since the two countries are identical, their tax and expenditure policies
will be identical in equilibrium. We therefore concentrate the analysis to the
representative country, which will be indexed by ”j”. Since the two countries
are identical, there will be no migration in equilibrium, i.e. Mj(·)=0 .
However, the incentives related to migration are, nevertheless, important in
the sense of inﬂuencing the decisions taken by each national government.
4.1 Shadow price of externalities




j] as the marginal
willingness to pay by type i to avoid the domestically created externality.
Similarly, we denote the Hicksian demands for clean and dirty consump-
tion goods by ˜ ci
j and ˜ xi






j]} in equation (30), we can use equations




















































j = Y 2
j −c2
j −pjx2
j is the total tax payment of type 2. Equation (31)
implicitly deﬁnes the equilibrium shadow price of the domestically created










and then using the short notation ¯ λj = λj[∂ˆ v2
j/∂B1
j]/γj,w ec a nd e r i v et h e
following result;
Proposition 3 In a noncooperative symmetric equilibrium with pareto ef-
ﬁcient mixed taxation, the shadow price of the externality in terms of the
































Even if migration is zero in the symmetric equilibrium, the incentives
related to migration will, nevertheless, aﬀect µj/γj.I nc o m p a r i s o nw i t ht h e
shadow price obtained in the cooperative equilibrium, equation (32) contains
two additional terms, both of which are proportional to the marginal disu-
tility of migration, d0(·), facing the high ability type. First, the higher the
consumption of dirty goods by the high ability type, the greater will be the
domestically created environmental damage. Since out-migration reduces the
aggregate consumption of the dirty good, there will be an incentive for the
national government to induce out-migration via higher eﬀective marginal tax
rates. This eﬀect works to increase σj and, therefore, to increase the shadow
price of the domestically created externality in terms of the government’s tax
revenues. Second, out-migration of high ability types reduces the tax base.
19To avoid a loss of tax base, the government will have incentives to reduce the
marginal tax rates by lowering the value of µj/γj.T h i se ﬀect is captured by
the ﬁnal term on the right hand side of the formula in the proposition. The
remaining terms in the expression for µj/γj reﬂect, respectively, the marginal
willingness to pay to avoid the externality, the self-selection constraint and
the impact of Ej on the consumption of dirty goods. An important diﬀerence
in comparison with the outcome of the cooperative equilibrium is that the
latter three terms only refer to country j: the corresponding eﬀects of Ej on
the other country are absent in the noncooperative equilibrium.
4.2 Commodity Taxation
By applying the same procedure as in the derivation of the commodity tax











we can derive the following result;
















The expression for the commodity tax on the dirty consumption good
takes the same general form as in the cooperative equilibrium. Neverthe-
less, the two tax formulas are diﬀerent in general, since the way in which
the shadow price of the externality is being measured diﬀers between the
regimes. A natural next question is whether the commodity tax on the dirty
consumption good in the noncooperative equilibrium exceeds, or falls short
20of, that corresponding to the cooperative equilibrium. Without further as-
sumptions, the diﬀerence between the two taxes can go in either direction.
To see this, consider ﬁrst a simpliﬁed version of the model where the high




j,g j,E j,E k)=φ(ϕ(ci
j,x i
j,g j),l i
j,E j,E k) for i =1 ,2, j =1 ,2



















where the superindices ”n”a n d” ∗” refer to, respectively, the noncooperative
and cooperative equilibrium. Then, if the sum of the marginal willingness to
pay to avoid the externality is a monotonous function of the commodity tax
rate, it trivially follows that the cooperative equilibrium implies a higher tax
than the noncooperative equilibrium. However, by relaxing the assumption
that the high ability types are immobile, this comparison becomes inconclu-
sive. This is so because the mobility incentives facing the high ability types
may change the commodity tax corresponding to the noncooperative equi-
librium in either direction compared to the case when the high ability types
are immobile. Similarly, by relaxing the assumption that leisure is separable
from the other goods, the self-selection constraints become operative in the
tax formulas. Since the qualitative eﬀect of the self-selection constraints is
ambiguous, and since each country’s commodity tax depends on all countries’
self-selection constraints in the cooperative equilibrium, one cannot rule out
the possibility that the self-selection constraints work to reduce the commod-
ity tax in the cooperative equilibrium relative to that in the noncooperative
equilibrium. As a consequence, the commodity tax in the noncooperative
equilibrium is not necessarily chosen to be lower than what is optimal from
21society’s point of view. We will return to this issue in Section 6 by ana-
lyzing the welfare eﬀects of a commodity tax reform in the noncooperative
equilibrium.
4.3 Eﬀective Marginal Tax Rates
By using equations (24)-(27) and (21), it is straight forward to show that
the formulas for the eﬀective marginal tax rates of both ability types closely
resemble the formulas derived in the cooperative equilibrium. The most im-
portant diﬀerences between the cooperative and noncooperative regimes refer
to the way in which the shadow price of the externality is being calculated.
These diﬀerences arise because (i) the welfare of the ’other country’ is not
part of the national policy makers’ objective functions in the noncooperative
framework, and (ii) the parameters of the migration function inﬂuence the
ﬁrst order conditions corresponding to the noncooperative equilibrium.
5 Implementation of the Cooperative Equi-
librium
Is it possible to implement the cooperative equilibrium in a decentralized
setting, where each individual country is allowed to choose its preferred tax
and expenditure policies? The answer to this question is yes, provided that
a ’federal’ government is able to correct the choices made by each national
government. Recall that the formal diﬀerences between the equilibria dis-
cussed in the previous two sections refer to the ﬁrst order conditions for Ej,
Y 2
j , B2
j, gj and qj. The necessary condition obeyed by Ej diﬀers between
the two equilibria because of uninternalized spillover eﬀects of environmental
damage and mobility incentives in the noncooperative equilibrium, whereas
the mobility incentives alone make the conditions for Y 2
j , B2
j, gj and qj dif-
22fer between equilibria. Therefore, to be able to implement the cooperative
equilibrium in a framework where each individual country acts in accordance
w i t ht h en o n c o o p e r a t i v em o d e l ,t h ef e d e r a lg o v e r n m e n tm u s tb ea b l et oa l t e r
the national government’s own choices of these ﬁve decision variables.
Suppose that the federal government imposes taxes/subsidies propor-
tional to Ej, Y 2
j , B2
j, gj and qj, which means that the national government’s
budget constraint can be written as
0=Y
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where j =1 ,2,a n dΓj is a lump-sum transfer received by (or a country



















To be able to describe the federal government’s policy as clearly as pos-
sible, let us denote the cooperative equilibrium by the superindex ”*”. In
addition, even if there are no incentives related to migration in this coop-
erative equilibrium, we use derivatives like e.g. ∂M∗
j /∂Ej, etc., to measure
d e r i v a t i v e so ft h em i g r a t i o nf u n c t i o nw h i c ha r ee v a l u a t e di nt h ec o o p e r a t i v e





































represent the terms by which the form of ﬁrst order condition for Ej diﬀers
between the cooperative and noncooperative regimes. Consider the following
result;















































for j =1 ,2, and uses the lump-sum transfer (or national fee to the federation)
to balance the national budget constraints, the noncooperative equilibrium will
coincide with the cooperative equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 5 is straight forward. Suppose that each na-




j , Y 2
j , gj, qj and Ej to maximize the utility of the low
ability type subject to equations (6), (7), (8), (23) and (34). By evaluating
the resulting ﬁrst order conditions at the symmetric cooperative equilibrium,
it follows that these ﬁrst order conditions (which are derived in a noncoop-
erative framework) will coincide with those formally derived in the context
of the symmetric cooperative equilibrium.
Note that, to implement the cooperative equilibrium in a decentralized
setting, where each individual country chooses its own tax and expenditure
policies, the federal government must solve the second best problem at the
24global level described in Section 3. The federal government can then design
the policy instruments required to make the national governments choose the
cooperative equilibrium as their preferred outcome. Since the two countries
are identical in all important respects, the taxes/subsidies imposed by the
federal government are the same for both countries.
6A D i ﬀerent View on ’Cooperation’
Clearly, even if it in principle is possible to implement the cooperative equi-
librium in a decentralized framework, the federal government would require
a large set of policy instruments. In practice, however, ’cooperation’ is not
likely to mean that diﬀerent countries pool their resources in order to im-
plement a socially optimal resource allocation on a global level. Following
Aronsson et al. (2000), it is equally important (and far more realistic) to
view ’cooperation over environmental policy’ as a policy project, the pur-
pose of which is to improve the resource allocation in comparison with the
initial equilibrium, in which no such cooperation takes place.
In this section, we assume that the initial (prereform) equilibrium is given
by the symmetric noncooperative equilibrium of Section 4. The purpose is
then to study the welfare eﬀects that will arise, if the countries agree to
slightly raise their commodity taxes. To operationalize the idea of a ’cooper-
ative policy project’, suppose that the countries decide to form a ’federal gov-
ernment’, and that the federal government imposes a (positive or negative)
uniform tax on the dirty consumption good which is added to the national
rates. The national governments also agree not to change their commodity
taxes in response to the federal commodity tax. The tax revenues collected
from country j via the federal commodity tax are payed back to country j
via a transfer payment to the national government. The federal government’s





j] − Rj(α)=0 (36)
for j =1 ,2,w h e r eα (which is assumed to be small) is the commodity tax
chosen by the federal government, and Rj(·) is a transfer payment from the
federal government to the (national) government of country j. An explicit
assumption of ﬁscal neutrality at the national level simpliﬁes the calculations
without aﬀecting the results. This is so because the prereform equilibrium is
symmetric, which means that the transfer payments from the federal to the
national governments will be of equal size.

































be the Lagrangean of country j evaluated in the symmetric noncooperative






































which will be used in the analysis below. The value function facing the federal
government is the sum of the country-speciﬁc objective functions evaluated
in the noncooperative equilibrium. It will be convenient to write the value
function in terms of the equilibrium values of the national policy instruments.

















j (α),g j(α),E j(α),E k(α))
(38)
26for k 6= j, in which the value of α is zero prior to the reform. The superindex
”n” (for noncooperative equilibrium) has been suppressed for notational con-
venience. Note also that the national policy variables and externalities caused




j , gj, Ej and Ek) are functions of α,
since the national policy decisions are being made conditional on the choices
of the federal government.
The cost beneﬁtr u l ew ea r el o o k i n gf o rc a nb ed e r i v e db yd i ﬀerentiating
the value function in equation (38) with respect to α a n dt h e ne v a l u a t i n g
the resulting derivative at the point where α =0 . The reader should note
that this policy reform will aﬀect the welfare level only because the prere-
form equilibrium is suboptimal from society’s point of view. It is, therefore,
convenient to write the cost beneﬁtr u l ef o rα in terms of mobility incentives
and transboundary externalities, which are the causes of suboptimality in
the noncooperative equilibrium. This is addressed in Proposition 6, which is
formally derived in the Appendix;
Proposition 6 The welfare eﬀect of introducing a small federal commodity
tax on the dirty good in the symmetric noncooperative equilibrium, when the




























for k 6= j.
In general, the welfare eﬀect of this policy reform can go in either direc-
tion. An interpretation is that a shift from national to federal commodity
taxation does not necessarily imply higher commodity taxes, even if national
commodity taxation does not fully internalize the externality. Equation (39)
is useful in the sense of showing what information we would require in order
27to determine the welfare eﬀect of increased or decreased commodity taxa-
tion in the noncooperative equilibrium. These informational requirements
include: (i) how the national policies aﬀect migration, (ii) how the national
policies respond to federal commodity taxation and (iii) the welfare eﬀects
arising via the transboundary part of the externality.
The terms in the ﬁrst row on the right hand side of equation (39) are
due to the mobility incentives underlying the national governments’ policy
decisions in the noncooperative equilibrium. Note that the derivatives of





j is the total tax payment made by a type 2 individual. Therefore,
as expected from Section 4, the welfare eﬀects arising via the derivatives of
the migration function depend on whether the mobility incentives implicit in
the noncooperative equilibrium make the national governments choose ’too
much’ or ’too little’ commodity taxation.
Consider ﬁr s tw h a th a p p e n sw h e nZ2
j < 0; a situation that may arise e.g.
when the consumption of dirty goods by type 2 is negligible. This means
that the national governments’ decisions about commodity taxation reﬂect
the incentive to reduce out-migration or cause in-migration, implying that
the prereform commodity taxes are relatively low. Increasing the commodity
taxes will then increase the welfare level via the term ∂Mj/∂qj = ∂Mj/∂α >
0. However, provided that ∂gj/∂α ≥ 0 and ∂Ej/∂α ≤ 0 (which may appear
to be reasonable assumptions), the remaining terms in the ﬁrst row will
not contribute to increase the welfare level, since higher public expenditures
and less domestic environmental damage tend to strengthen the (incorrect)
mobility incentives characterizing the policy in the initial equilibrium. If, on
the other hand, Z2
j > 0, the arguments will go the other way around. Finally,
the term in the second row of equation (39) is the direct spillover eﬀect of
environmental damage times the impact of the federal commodity tax on the
externality caused by the other country.
28Note ﬁnally that in the absence of preexisting distortions, the welfare ef-
fect of this tax reform will be equal to zero. This is seen by calculating the
corresponding cost beneﬁt rule for the cooperative equilibrium, where mobil-
ity incentives have no inﬂuence over national tax policies, and the spillover
eﬀect of environmental damage is optimally chosen from society’s point of
view.
7 Summary and Discussion
This paper addresses transboundary environmental problems and labor mo-
bility in the context of an optimal tax problem for a two-country economy.
Each individual country is represented by a two type model, where the abil-
ity of a given individual cannot be observed by the policy maker, and the
tax instruments include commodity taxation and nonlinear income taxation.
The analysis is based on the assumptions that (i) high ability types are mo-
bile whereas the low ability types are not, and (ii) the environmental damage
caused by each country spills over to the other country. The main purpose of
the paper is to compare the ’conditionally optimal’ second best policy that
will arise in a noncooperative equilibrium with the outcome of cooperation.
Even if the two countries are identical by assumption, implying that mi-
gration is equal to zero, the mobility incentives facing the high ability type
will aﬀect the optimal tax policy in the noncooperative equilibrium. This
inﬂuence arises via the shadow price of the domestically created external-
ity, and two separate eﬀects can be identiﬁed. First, out-migration of high
ability types reduces the tax base. To avoid a loss of tax base, the na-
tional government will have an incentive to lower the implicit shadow price
of the externality and, therefore, reducing the commodity tax and the ef-
fective marginal tax rate. Second, out-migration also reduces the aggregate
consumption of the dirty good, which makes the externality less severe for
29domestic consumers. This provides an environmental beneﬁtf r o mt h ep o i n t
of view of the national government and tends to increase the shadow price
of the externality.
Mobility incentives have no inﬂuence over tax policy in the symmetric
cooperative equilibrium, since the ’global policy maker’ recognizes that the
two countries are identical and can, therefore, anticipate that migration will
be equal to zero. In the cooperative equilibrium, the shadow price of the
externality facing each country reﬂects all welfare eﬀects (both domestically
and abroad) of the environmental damage generated by that particular coun-
try. However, contrary to most previous studies on global externalities, the
optimal commodity tax is not directly interpretable as a ’full’ Pigouvian tax
reﬂecting the sum of the willingness to pay to reduce the externality. This
is so because the ’Samuelsonian sum of willingness to pay’ is only one part
of the shadow price of the externality in the cooperative equilibrium and,
therefore, only part of the optimal commodity tax. The shadow price of the
externality facing each country will also reﬂect the self-selection constraint
and the consumption of dirty goods in the other country. This is clearly
diﬀerent from results in studies where the ﬁrst best cooperative equilibrium
constitutes the reference case, which suggests that the optimal ’environmen-
tal tax’ required to internalize transboundary externalities is dependent upon
the whole set of policy instruments in all countries involved.
It is (in principle) possible to implement the cooperative equilibrium in
a decentralized setting, where each national policy maker acts in accordance
with the noncooperative model. This can be accomplished by allowing a ’fed-
eral government’ to provide correct incentives for the national policy makers.
However, it is important to note that the federal policy maker must be al-
lowed to possess several nonstandard policy instruments in order to achieve
the cooperative outcome in a decentralized setting. It is, therefore, more real-
istic to view ’cooperation over environmental policy’ as a policy project, the
30purpose of which is to improve the resource allocation in comparison with the
initial equilibrium. The ﬁnal part of the paper addresses the welfare conse-
quences of cooperation over the commodity tax by allowing a federal govern-
ment to add a commodity tax on top of the national commodity taxes. The
prereform situation is represented by the noncooperative equilibrium. We
show how the welfare eﬀects of this reform is related to the transboundary
externality and mobility incentives, which are the causes of suboptimality in
the noncooperative equilibrium.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 6:























































The necessary conditions obeyed by the symmetric noncooperative equilib-
rium are interpretable in terms of derivatives of the Lagrangean in equa-
tion (37). The necessary conditions imply; ∂Lj/∂B1










j, ∂Lj/∂gj = −[∂Mj/∂gj]Z2
j and ∂Lj/∂Ej = −[∂Mj/∂Ej]Z2
j.









j /∂α], gives equation (39).
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